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AbstrACt Jazz rhetoric can mean two things. The ﬁrst is the discourse about jazz, its sig-
niﬁcance and its meaning. The second is the music itself as an unfolding form performed to
an audience. Both have constitutive political effects that function through pathos prior to a
distinction between subject and object. This pathos arises through in-betweenness or interality,
and can be described in terms of the middle voice, Dasein, and aesthetic experience. This ar-
ticle develops these concepts through a discussion of the jazz rhetorics of Wynton Marsalis
and Amiri Baraka. 
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RÉSUMÉ La rhétorique du jazz englobe deux phénomènes  : Les discours sur le jazz, le
décrivant, le donnant sens et signiﬁcation et la musique jazz en tant que telle, qui apparait
et se donne forme lors de sa mise en scène devant un auditoire. Ces deux ont des effets
constitutifs d’ordre politique à travers un pathos qui précède toute distinction entre objet et
sujet. Ce pathos émerge de l’intéral, d’une lacune relationnelle à laquelle on peut réﬂéchir se
servant de concepts tels la voix moyenne, le  Dasein, et l’expérience esthétique. Ceux-ci
informent une analyse des rhétoriques jazz de Wynton Marsalis et d’Amiri Baraka.
Mots Clés Rhétorique; Jazz; African-American; Ontology; Aesthetics
Q. I am struck by your attempt to discuss jazz and rhetoric in one breath. rhetoric
usually means persuasive speech, but you seem to be describing a musical form and
focusing on how it calls forth certain forms of consciousness. I would describe this in
terms of interality, which is constituted in anticipations and in unresolved tensions.
Could interality help us understand jazz? does jazz help us understand interality?
A. I think so, but I must confess that interality is not a concept that I am very
familiar with. you have described interality as something like “betweenness,” and I
would argue that jazz manifests betweenness musically and culturally. Jazz
developed historically through the (in many ways violent) encounter between
european and African musical elements. Also, much of jazz is based in
improvisation, where music and dance unfold between the constraints of form and
what has already transpired and the openness of possibility. After all, one of jazz’s
guiding maxims is that there is “no such thing as a wrong note, it depends on how
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you resolve it.” the musical signiﬁcance of each note in an improvisation is between
what precedes and what follows. 
Q. but isn’t that true of all music? each note is always between its predecessor and
successor.
A. each note played only has signiﬁcance in relation to what precedes and follows.
strictly speaking, while our ears perceive air vibration frequencies or tones, we hear
notes, which are tones organized within musical scales. Notes only exist as a relation
of tones. to hear music is to hear a sequence of intervals, of relationships between
tones unfolding in time. what is signiﬁcant in jazz is that the next note, the note
that is about to occur, is neither predetermined nor overdetermined, even when one
plays a standard, a well-known piece. Performers can deviate from the given score.
And of course, during an improvisation, there is great latitude regarding the choice
of the next note. Furthermore, should one accidentally play a “wrong note,” by
which I mean an unintended note, one can “recover” through the choice of the next
note, and retroactively make the unintended note ﬁt. Imagine if typing errors could
be so “corrected”! but there is more to in-betweenness in jazz than open-endedness
and improvisation. Jazz, like much if not all music, has dispositional and
constitutive effects that arise fundamentally in and through betweenness. this is in
part because music is immersive, in part because music unfolds as a form and hence
creates and satisﬁes expectations, but also because music is constitutive of being.
Furthermore, because jazz is an improvised music, the being-in-constitution is
marked by in-betweenness. Finally, and signiﬁcantly, jazz’s constitutive effects are
not only on an affective or aesthetic plane, but on a cultural and political one as well.
In what follows, I would like to offer ways of thinking about the linkages be-
tween the aesthetics and politics of jazz. In my mind, this requires considering jazz
in terms of rhetoric. rhetoric is usually understood to be the art of language that
produces oratory and political speech, but its philosophical roots and theoretical de-
velopment go well beyond that. rhetoric’s fundamental concern is how worlds are
brought into being. In part, this is through the power of logos, of the w/word, not as
a sign, but as an invoking, a  ﬁguring, an  enrapturing, a  musiking. Music conspires
with this logos, providing pathos, and so power. rhetoric, in its original conception,
profoundly manifests betweenness. that is to say, rhetoric’s origins are prior to the
development of what derrida refers to as the “metaphysics of presence” (derrida,
1976, p.  23), which takes as given a transcendental signiﬁed and sets up the subject-
object distinction, which opens on to the possibility of man mastering nature
through knowledge (Heidegger & lovitt, 2013). 
before this break, usually attributed to Plato, the being of beings was an in-be-
tween, in rhythmic movement. being and world emerged together in co-constitu-
tion, a process preﬁgured through affective disposition. Much of this has been devel-
oped by Heidegger, who once taught a seminar on rhetoric and developed his early
thought through his reading of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, which he asserted “must be
taken as the ﬁrst systematic hermeneutic of the everydayness of being with one an-
other” (Heidegger, 1962, p.  178). Although Aristotle’s Rhetoric itself is less a philo-
sophical treatise than an “art” or handbook on how to develop convincing speeches
in an ethical polity or polis (i.e., Athens) that prized the power of language more
than violence, its philosophical starting points are far-reaching. Aristotle recognized
that humans come to conviction not through reason alone, but through the interac-
tion of logos, pathos, and ethos, where logos means argument, pathos means emotion
or sentiment, and ethos refers to the character or trustworthiness of the one speak-
ing. Pathos is primordial, because dispositional. the pathē (emotions, moods, attune-
ments) are the source of care, interest, openness, and so  on. Ethos, itself arising from
pathos, is most powerful because audiences will not accept arguments from those
they do not trust. Logos is important because it addresses the distinctly human fac-
ulty of reason, even if it is concerned with what is probable and a matter of opinion
rather than what can be demonstrated with certainty. this way of framing coming to
conviction led Heidegger to conclude that human being, Dasein or “there-being,”
emerges in and toward the world.  beings come to be as they apprehend a world
they are disposed to through an ontologically prior pathos, which Heidegger trans-
lates as Stimmung, which in english means mood or attunement.
Q. does Heidegger’s understanding of Stimmung bring us to jazz?
A. Not directly, but it highlights aspects of pre-modern ontology that we might
otherwise overlook, which in turn helps us understand the politics of music. In the
Rhetoric, Aristotle discusses pathos in terms of emotions rather than mood. this is
because, from a practical standpoint, the successful orator will seek to manipulate
emotions—short-term dispositional states such as anger, envy, and their opposites—
to advantage, in order to enhance audience receptivity. while we could skip over
Heidegger and go directly to the early texts, his translation of pathos as Stimmung is
suggestive, because mood is less punctual and more diffuse than emotion, and so
calls our attention to ﬁelds of affective disposition, such as those produced by music.
Aristotle does not discuss music in the Rhetoric, since he is concerned there with
oratory, but Jeffrey walker (2008) argues that his brief treatment of music in
Politics V is key to understanding the Rhetoric because it renders explicit the
workings of pathē in relation to ethos and action. 
Aristotle identiﬁes two fundamental principles. the ﬁrst, consistent with his un-
derstanding of habitus, is that one’s practices form one’s soul or psyche. thus, for ex-
ample, “  ‘mechanics’ and ‘laborers’ (banausoi and thêtoi) have souls ‘distorted from
their natural dispositions’ (parestrammenai tês kata phusin hexeôs)” (walker, 2008,
p.  77). Furthermore, the effect of practices on the soul extends to musical taste:
these workers “are thus responsive to music that ‘deviates’ from the normal modes
with high-strung, chromatically irregular melodies and discordant harmonies”
(walker, 2008, p.  77). the second element of Aristotle’s view is that, against such
predispositions, music can have a transformational effect as well because rhythm
and melody offer likenesses (omonoia) to character traits and imitations (mimesis)
of moral habits (McKeon, 1936). As walker further explains, “Aristotle says that any
pathos that can occur ‘strongly’ in some ‘souls’ or psyches occurs in all, in greater or
lesser degree, and can be ‘roused’ by the appropriate kind of music, and that those
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who experience this musically induced emotion are ‘put into a state (kathistame-
nous, cf. kathistêmi) just as if receiving a medical treatment and katharsis’ (1342a)”
(walker, 2008, p. 77). Music can corrupt the citizen even as it can civilize the worker
or slave. Finally, walker observes that while katharsis is usually a medical or religious
term, it is used by Aristotle in a manner similar to Gorgias, for whom music and lo-
gos, in the sense of word, are pharmakons that much like a drug put the soul of the
hearer “ ‘into a state’ of courage or delight, as well as any other mood” (walker,
2008, p.  78).
Q. why is the idea of a drug important here?
A. this brings us back to what you are calling interality. drugs not only “distort”
perception, they transform subjectivity itself. western metaphysics leads us to think
of communication in terms of a sender-receiver model: A sender gives a speech or
plays the blues, and you receive and decode it. this is such a lame account. If the
speech or song resonates, you are moved. you are no longer where you were or who
you were before. In fact, it becomes fallacious to even speak of “you” as an essence
or ﬁxed position. the ontology of there-being, which Heidegger takes from Aristotle,
does not distinguish categorically between being and world. being emerges in the
world and changes along with the world. this being is always becoming. At the risk
of reproducing western metaphysical categories, we could say that the object of
perception transforms the perceiving subject, or more precisely, the being of there-
being and the there of there-being are always entangled, to borrow the concept of
entanglement from quantum theory.
Q. does that mean that all music is drug-like and constitutive? what about the
music I hear in the shopping mall?
A. several years ago, James Crosswhite argued that rhetorical studies should expand
its understanding of pathos to include mood, and that a full account of public
rhetoric would even include background music in malls (Crosswhite, 1989). there-
being might then take the form of shopping-being or bored-being, I suppose. let’s
face it, most of us do not go to the mall to listen to its music, and those who produce
mall music do not consider us audiences. their aim is that we become immersed
and reconstituted through musical pathos as mall-subjects. while the ontological
process is pretty much the same in each musical encounter, the character of there-
beings is contingent on the given musical forms as well as the already given
character of beings in the moment of musical encounter. I recently heard Hendrix in
a local mall’s jewellery store. I  doubt that the owner had a hand in it, but the music
certainly transformed my mall experience because it was Hendrix, and because I
was already familiar with his music and its roots.
Q. you said that you were interested in jazz. Is this only a matter of taste, or is jazz-
being special in some way?
A. taste is part of it. there are as many states of being-with-music as there are
musical forms and traditions. I could say that I like jazz, but putting it this way re-
animates the subject-object distinction that I am trying to avoid. expressing it
properly would require the middle voice, which english lacks. It was available in
Ancient Greek, which might have inspired Heidegger’s abstruse style and such
phrases as “nothing noths the thing.” I suppose I could say that jazzing beings 
me-jazzed or jazz beings me-in-attunement. In other words, I resonate in jazz-
moodedness. but there is more to it. Jazz sensibility or more precisely its sensibilities
ranging from louis Armstrong’s “west end blues” to John Coltrane’s A Love
Supreme are linked to the political sphere much more explicitly than most musical
forms. Admittedly, the history of western music is animated by debates regarding
the emotional meanings of given works and how these are expressed or engendered
by various forms, genres, compositions, and performances. Furthermore, this history
is marked by claims regarding which among these are ethically superior. but with
jazz, the question is not only ethical, not only about how the music disposes the
soul, but also about how it functions to give rise to forms of political community.
Furthermore, there are competing rhetorics of jazz.
Q. what do you mean by “rhetorics of jazz”?
A. I mean two things. First, I mean discourses or lines of argument that address the
ethical, cultural, and political aspects of jazz. I call these “rhetorics” because they are
directed toward persuasion. Claims are made regarding jazz and on behalf of jazz.
they describe jazz, celebrate it, and also advocate certain forms of jazz practice. there
are several different rhetorics of this sort, which offer quite distinct interpretations
and vocations for jazz. second, by “rhetorics of jazz” I mean “arts” in the way that
Aristotle’s Rhetoric is an “art,” which is to say a practical guide to composition based
on an understanding of the effects of form. It might seem strange to us to think of
music in rhetorical terms, but the idea was quite common among renaissance
scholars, including Zarlino, burmeister, and Glareanus (Vickers, 1988), who treated
rhetoric as a master, and so “architectonic” art, to use McKeon’s term (McKeon &
backman, 1987). And while one can make a persuasive case that musicians or
musicologists inﬂuenced by the Italian Humanists applied rhetorical principles too
mechanistically and carried the speech-music analogy too far, as in their debates over
the relative merits of monody, of a single musical line as in Gregorian chants, versus
harmony, with multiple lines—think choral music in counterpoint—sharpe (2000)
convincingly argues that music and oratory are alike in that their affective meaning
and power arises in their performance, as they unfold in time before an audience.
Furthermore, and importantly, these two types of rhetoric are related. Claims on
behalf of jazz, of its political and social importance, are based not only on its socio-
cultural history but also on the dispositional effects of its musical elements.
Consider this striking instance of a rhetoric of jazz spoken by wynton Marsalis,
Grammy-winning trumpet player, educator, and artistic director of New york’s Jazz
at lincoln Center in the ﬁnal episode of Ken burns’ 19-hour 2001 Pbs documentary
series on jazz in America:
the thing in jazz  … that would make all of these people [jazz greats]
give their lives for this, and they did give their lives for it, is that it
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gives us a glimpse into what America is going to be when it becomes
itself, and this music tells you that it will become itself, and when you
get a taste of that, there’s just nothing else you going [sic] to taste
that’s as sweet, that’s a sweet taste, man. (burns, 2001)
this is a remarkable statement, for Marsalis metaphorically links physical sensa-
tion, aesthetic experience, political experience, and the being of America as he
praises jazz as a distinctly American art form. this rhetoric, which dominates burns’
documentary, ﬁgures jazz as America’s ethical saviour. As david Harlan explains:
[U]nderlying the whole nineteen hours is burns’ stubborn hope that
in the genius of louis Armstrong and duke ellington, Charlie Parker
and billie Holiday—that is to say, in the continual improvising car-
ried on by the sons and daughters of American slaves—America
might ﬁnd [citing burns] “the way not only towards our own future
but towards redemption for the crimes that permitted this injustice
to happen.” (Marsalis & ward, 2009, p.  40)
such views are not uncommon among jazz writers and critics: Jazz is “Amer-
ica’s music” and in large measure responsible for America’s unique and in part
Africanized cultural sensibility. Indeed, it is rare to ﬁnd any history of American pop-
ular music that does not recognize the central importance of blues and jazz, origi-
nally African-American forms. It is furthermore not unusual for jazz to be praised
for realizing in nuce the American promise of freedom and equality. Furthermore,
jazz occupies pride of place in reﬂections on the aesthetic politics of race: to it is at-
tributed African-American, American, or black “structures of feeling,” to use ray-
mond williams’ (1977) evocative but ill-deﬁned concept. Jazz instantiates, mediates,
and calls forth a racialized and politicized life-world.
In considering Marsalis’ vision of jazz, it is important to recall that rhetorical
practice is agonistic, that is to say it is born in struggle and manifest in controversy.
thus Marsalis’ remark cannot be seen as merely a report on a state of affairs. It is a
claim, which is meaningful as a response to actual or potential counter-claims. He is
advocating for jazz in the face of both popular indifference and competing jazz
rhetorics. Marsalis, echoing Albert Murray, argues that while jazz emerges from the
African-American experience, it is a music for all Americans because it swings:
“swing—the dance and the music—bespeaks the ﬂexible nature of American life. …
[In swing,] every beat requires musicians to reassess their relationship to one an-
other. this is what makes swinging so challenging. you are forced to constantly be
aware of other people’s feelings” (Marsalis & ward, 2009, p.  40). Furthermore, as
Marsalis explains to supreme Court Justice sandra day o’Connor, “the Constitution
is a supreme example of swing. How can we ﬁgure out how to meet each other’s ob-
jectives and be together and for it to feel so good? Now, when we look at swing, it
brings together opposites” (Marsalis & ward, 2009, pp.  171–172).
Against the redemptive vision offered by Marsalis, African-American poet and
cultural critic Amiri baraka celebrates jazz’s potential as a medium for authentic
black expression in the face of the cultural co-optations of white America. while he
does not denounce swing in itself, and indeed praises some African-American jazz
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performances as “swinging,” he is wary of what swing became as it crossed the
colour line: “swing music, which was the result of arranged big-band jazz, as it de-
veloped to a music that had almost nothing to do with blues, had very little to do
with black America, though that is certainly where it had come from. but there were
now more and more Negroes like that, too” (baraka, 1963, pp.  164–165). Critical of
what he considered the assimilated black middle class, baraka’s commitment was
not to America, but to the development of black culture through an avant-garde or
“out” black arts movement. thus, unlike Marsalis, who seeks to remain within the
structure of feeling or mood of a continuous tradition, baraka admits black roots
and acknowledges the canonical contributions of black artists from louis Arm-
strong and duke ellington to John Coltrane, but seeks to move beyond them. re-
viewing a 1966 performance in Newark, he observes:
listening to sonny Murray, you can hear the primal needs of the new
music. the heaviest emotional indentation it makes. From ghostly
moans of spirit, let out full to the heroic march spirituals and priestly
celebrations of new blackness. I mention sonny here—and Albert Ayler
and sun-ra—because their music is closest to the actual soul-juice, cul-
tural genius of the new black feeling. the tone their music takes is a
clear emotional reading of where the new music is. And Pharoah
[sanders], Marion [brown], Charles Moore and the others got into it the
other night. And sound ran through us like blood. (baraka, 1967, p.  154)
“Ghostly moans” alludes to work songs and early blues, just as “spirituals” does
to an important strain of African-American choral music, but although these ele-
ments may emerge from a tradition, they are given voice in a “new music” with a
“new feeling” consubstantial with black blood, which will not be compromised by
white sensibilities or by what baraka considers hard bop’s reactionary and unimagi-
native taking up of blues and gospel ﬁgures in response to the challenge of bebop.
Jazz history is usually written as a succession of genres, at least until the late
1950s, when a number of new forms emerged pretty much contemporaneously in
the wake of bebop, the genre identiﬁed with Charlie Parker and dizzy Gillespie that
fundamentally transformed jazz. Marsalis considers this development of styles an
augmentation, while baraka treats it as a series of negations, of syntheses or over-
comings. For both, jazz has black roots, improvisation is fundamental, and the mu-
sic emerges from historical experience, but for Marsalis, jazz emerges in a conversa-
tion with a tradition and works through a given form. For baraka, the new music
reaches back to authentic roots and reworks their elements, but is directed forward
and outward, against familiarity, even as its authenticity requires a staunch commit-
ment to blackness. In other words, for Marsalis the black experience is a constitutive
element of jazz as a home for American being, while for baraka true jazz opens a
clearing for the emergence of new African-American being.
Q. so jazz is not one thing?
A. exactly. like most musical and artistic forms, genres, and movements, jazz is not
monolithic. In addition, jazz itself is a politically contested ﬁeld. Indeed, many jazz
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artists and critics have been uncomfortable with the term “jazz,” because they see it
carrying limiting stereotypes ranging from brothel music, the devil’s music, popular
dance music, smoky nightclub music, to a dated or defunct commercial style. As
such, much separates the aesthetic and political centres of the three rhetorics of jazz
I have outlined. Nevertheless, they lay claim to a common musical heritage rooted
in African-American culture and experience and assert the genius of certain
canonical ﬁgures, such as duke ellington and John Coltrane. Furthermore, they
share the view that music has the power to open subjectivity, being, or the “soul” to
forms of collective life.
these rhetorics of jazz echo the Italian Humanists, as well as Nietzsche and 
Heidegger, for whom the world comes to appearance through metaphor in a poetic
aletheia or unconcealing. of course, poetic language, even if allusive, has a cognitive
component. It is rhetorical as it announces and ﬁgures a world to behold. but this
beholding must be subtended by an apprehensive stance, which is constituted affec-
tively through form. thus, as Heidegger’s student Grassi (1980) explains, for Horace
the constitutive power of poetic rhetoric derives from “Musike—not music, but the
organizing power of the muses and poets—[which] creates the measure for every-
thing that is not merely ‘outside’ of man in the form of ‘external nature,’ but which
manifests itself in him, in his drives and passion” (p.  75). In this, the world does not
stand objectively, nor is it beheld by a subject that stands apart from or before it.
rather, the world’s appearance exists only in a relating to an apprehending standing-
being within it. In Heidegger’s terms, Dasein, being-in-the-world, emerges though af-
fective disposition, through Stimmung (his translation of pathos), meaning mood or
attunement. In other words, there-being is attuned or mooded being. As such, this
being is neither a monad nor static, for it is attuned to harmony and rhythm as un-
folding movements of expectations, tensions, and resolutions.
Q. you seem to like using present participles as nouns.
A. I am trying to convey a process and ongoing movement with neither subject nor
object. this is a common device in Heidegger’s writing, as he attempts to write in
the middle voice, which “puts our dominant voices in question and hence moves
aside the fundamental beginning” (scott, 1988, p.  160). what I have been trying to
get at is that both music and rhetoric work in a constitutive manner, in that they
bring forth subjectivity affectively. Furthermore, I do not want to suggest a subject-
object distinction where an autonomous musician or orator acts through music or
speech upon an audience, bringing that audience to a new subjectivity. rather, I
want to argue that musicians, orators, and audiences are always already in a middle,
even when they do not so see themselves. Furthermore, these jazz rhetorics, in both
the sense of speech about jazz and in the structures of jazz performance, highlight
this betweenness, or what you call interality, although each in its own way. 
summarizing Plato’s Phaedrus, Grassi (1980) notes its distinction between three
kinds of speech. there is speech that affects the passions using images that do not
arise from insight. this would be false speech, “rhetorical” speech in the usual sense.
there is speech that is entirely rational, which is to say theoretical, and thus divorced
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from the passions. Finally, there is “true rhetorical speech … [that] springs from the ar-
chai [(the structure of being and world itself)], nonreducible, moving, and indicative,
due to its original images” (p.  30). Grassi argues that the Italian Humanists shared this
part of Plato’s view of language. He also argues that poetic language is at the origin of
human historical consciousness, that it provides the basis for apprehending the world,
and that it is fundamentally metaphorical and based in pathos. thus, true rhetorical
speech is not conceptual; pathos precedes apodeixis (demonstration). Furthermore,
this pathos is mooded rhythmically and musically: “dante deﬁnes poetic language as a
‘rhetorical idea presented in music’  ” (p.  76). Metaphor offers a grasping of the human
historical world through likenesses, and likeness itself is constituted through measure,
including rhythm and tone. Furthermore, effective poetry cannot rely on just any
metaphor. Chosen metaphors must be perspicacious, arising from the poet’s ingenium,
which is to say imaginative capacity to ﬁgure “the relationship between things in order
to grasp their fundamental meaning” (p.  91) with respect to human existence. As
bruni explains, this grasping occurs by “uncovering the ‘similar in the unsimilar,’ i.e.,
what cannot be deduced rationally” (p.  92). Uncovering here is a key term, since it re-
calls what the Greeks referred to as aletheia, a knowing based in a moment of revealing
and concealing. the Italian Humanists, in a manner consistent with Plato’s under-
standing of true rhetoric in the Phaedrus, required that the rhetor-poet have insights
in harmony with the fundamental nature of the universe or arche. this was not a mat-
ter of hearing the truth or seeing things as they are, but of being attuned to the muses
or to the divine spirit, just as Heidegger demands of beings that they be authentic,
through attunement with the fundamental moods of being. As such, the world comes
to be and is coherent to the understanding through an ordering based in a measure
the muses provide in rhythmic movement. Grassi explains:
In the activities of the Muses, the concept of order plays a prevalent
and unifying part. the order of movements appears in the dance, the
order of tones in song, and the order of words in verse. Furthermore,
order is the starting point of rhythm and harmony. … the reference
made in [Plato’s] Laws to the “order of movement” seems particularly
signiﬁcant because movement represents a fundamental phenome-
non in the realm of existence; whatever is perceived through the
senses shows a becoming, that is, a movement in itself (change) or a
movement in space. through the application of a measure, movement
proceeds within certain barriers and under certain laws; it is, as one
might put it, “arranged.” (p.  31)
the muses do not offer concepts, but “‘open’ a cosmos. … through the Muses,
confusion, obscurity and the like are cleared away and abolished. All these funda-
mental characteristics of the Muses create the state of μανια [mania], of rapture, of
frenzy” (Grassi, 1983, p.  15).
Q. doesn’t this mean that ingenium is related to truth?
A. that is difﬁcult to answer, since it depends upon what you mean by both
“related” and “truth.” As you know, socrates was committed to a real prior to the
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realm of appearances. the Italian Humanists were Christians and believed in God.
similarly, Heidegger ultimately was committed to the realization of authentic being.
Nevertheless, ingenium does not proceed through representation but through
ﬁguration; it is not cognitive, not based in logos, but affective, based in pathos. As
such, it is not guided by “truth” as correspondence; there is no single truth, but
various serviceable orientations toward existence that it can bring forth; it provides
attunements.
A commonplace in jazz education is that listening is central to the art. this is
most clearly illustrated by proﬁcient drummers whose four limbs can work inde-
pendently, each one responding to one of the ensemble members. As Ingrid Monson
(1996) explains, beyond technical proﬁciency, the improvising jazz musician must
master listening to the other members of the ensemble to know what and when to
play. An optimal performance manifests the spontaneity and synergy of a conversa-
tion or, better yet, an interacting African-American congregation. when this occurs,
musicians are in the middle. toshio Akiyoshi, the Japanese composer and pianist,
likens this moment to Zen. “basically, it’s that you are not there. … the process we
are talking about, which some call mooshing, is a process of creating or actually be-
coming the music” (Moore, 2004, p. 402). In this mania, the inspired musician has
the ingenium to hear and bring forth what is potentially present in a historically situ-
ated moment of human existence. of course, this does not mean that the enthralled
jazz musician is actually captured by goddesses or spirits, but that in improvisation
he or she enters a state of simultaneous attunement and self-effacement. there is no
self-possession, but neither is there dispossession. rather, a clearing arises where a
self-in-performance, a self-in-the-middle emerges, neither overdetermined by the
past (or a score), not held in a static present, but moving iteratively outward. Fur-
thermore, this self-in-performance opens a space that audiences may also enter. the
performance not only constitutes the performer in the middle, but calls forth the lis-
tener as well. this musical calling forth of an audience also unfolds in a rhetorical
middle voice. It must address the there-being of its audience even as it reworks it,
seizing the Kairos.
the rhetorics of jazz that we have seen offer variants of this movement. For
Marsalis, jazz is attuned to the America-being-itself, for baraka authentic avant-garde
jazz is attuned to blackness. this leads to distinct artistic trajectories. Marsalis favours
a jazz that resides ﬁrmly in the tradition, attuned to dance, eros, and the body, and so
providing an afﬁrmative and familiar home for being. Jazz being would be manifest
as swing-dancing-with-others-being, afﬁrmation-in-blues-being, bop-dissensus-in-
community-being, and ellingtonian-eloquence-being. Marsalis ﬁnds these in the
groove of blues, the rhythm of swing, the improvised conversations of the jazz
combo, and their distillation in musical composition. Marsalis is at home in
Armstrong’s New orleans, Count basie’s Kansas City, and thelonious Monk’s Harlem,
where even dissonant and strained improvisation continues to respond to the pull of
form, of functional harmony with its play of anticipations, and of danceable rhythmic
movement. baraka also recognizes the signiﬁcance of these, but is wary of stagnation
and the dilution of black music by white or middle-class sensibilities. His Marxist-in-
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formed advocacy of the black arts movement in the 1960s celebrated jazz’s ability to
express black experience and he applauded what he termed “the newly forming
avant-garde” for innovations and departures that continued to rely upon authentic
black elements:
blues was the original Afro-American music, and bebop the reem-
phasis of the non-western tradition. And if the latter saved us from
the vapid wastes of swing, singlehandedly, the new avant-garde (and
John Coltrane) are saving us from the comparatively vapid ’50s. And
they both utilized the same general methods: getting the music back
to its initial rhythmic impetuses and away from the attempts at
rhythmic regularity and melodic predictability that the ’30s and ’40s
had laid on it. (baraka 1967, p.  79)
In this, baraka like Marsalis is committed to roots, but not to the home that
Marsalis’ aesthetic provides. thus, while sharing common origins, their aesthetic
sensibilities diverge. Furthermore, politics resides within this divergence. Marsalis is
attuned to the sweetness of America-in-itself, while baraka is attuned to authentic-
blackness-despite-America. this does not mean, however, that their differences are
consequent of a prior political choice. the world comes to appear as one resides aes-
thetically within it. Neither reason nor deduction determines this residing. It arises
beyond logos, in the pathos of musike. the politics of jazz arise through ingenium¸
through the aesthetic ﬁguration of Dasein.
Q. Are you saying that Marsalis and baraka together “cover” the ﬁeld of possible
modes of jazz being?
A. Hardly. there are other jazz sensibilities and other political rhetorics of jazz.
Marsalis and baraka’s rhetorics of jazz have been particularly inﬂuential, however,
particularly in policing the boundaries of what will be called jazz. each in his own
way insists that not all contemporary improvised music is jazz: the trajectory of jazz
originates in and carries forward the African-American experience. Not everyone
would agree. there are other jazz rhetorics. Furthermore, jazz is performed and
heard internationally, and being-attuned-to-jazz-in-Montréal, being-attuned-to-jazz-
in-Montreux, and being-attuned-to-jazz-in-1930s-Harlem cannot be the same. being
ﬂows and changes. It cannot be pinned down categorically. 
My claim is more modest: Jazz provides us with the opportunity to examine
how affect or aesthetic experience is politically signiﬁcant as it elicits modes of at-
tunement. Furthermore, we can understand this process of attunement as an un-
folding that is not based in a distinct subject and object of experience. rather, this
unfolding arises in-between; I suppose you would say that it is interal. speciﬁcally,
world, music, musician, and audience are becoming through an interplay of pathē,
which furthermore is open to possibility through improvisation. Finally, this tells us
that one need be neither black nor American to be attuned to jazz, just as one need
not be white to be attuned to country music or bach. rather, while it would be fool-
ish to contend that these or any other aesthetic forms can offer each an identical ex-
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perience, they offer the possibility of shared attunements and fellow feelings, and
can serve as what Kenneth burke refers to as “equipment for living.” 
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